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Abstract 
 
The article analyses the redistributive effect attained by personal income tax, social 
security contributions and social benefits in Slovenia and Croatia. The redistributive 
effect is decomposed first to reveal progressivity and horizontal inequity effects, and 
further to show contributions of different tax and benefit instruments. Even though both 
countries started from the same socioeconomic background two decades ago, the current 
results reveal divergence that is a consequence of diverse development during this 
period. The results indicate that Croatia experienced significantly higher pre-fiscal 
income inequality and lower redistributive effect than Slovenia. Horizontal inequity 
effects, though, were higher in Slovenia than in Croatia. In both countries, the means-
tested social benefits exerted an over-proportionate influence on vertical effects, 
suggesting a strong impact of the welfare state on income position of their residents, but 
also induced a large amount of horizontal inequity. In Slovenia, the non-means-tested 
benefits slightly increased income inequality. 
 
Key words: redistributive effect, horizontal inequity, taxes and benefits, decomposition, 
Slovenia, Croatia. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Social security programs provide income assistance in the form of social benefits to 
individuals and their families in the case of unemployment, work injury, maternity, 
sickness, old age, or permanent earning inability. They are financed by social security 
contributions, as well as by other taxes. In this article, we focus our research on tax and 
benefit systems consisting of social benefits, social security contributions and personal 
income tax (PIT). 
 Given their size in modern states, tax and benefit systems have a significant 
influence on income distribution. Generally, tax and benefit systems reduce income 
differences between high-income and low-income households. Income inequality 
reduction caused by tax and benefit systems is called the redistributive effect, and it is 
equal to the difference between pre-tax-and-benefit (or pre-fiscal) income inequality and 
post-tax-and-benefit (or post-fiscal) income inequality. 
 A more detailed analysis of the redistributive process reveals its complexity. 
Usually, one distinguishes between vertical equity and horizontal inequity, perceiving 
them as two opposite “forces”. Vertical equity is achieved through inequality reduction 
between richer and poorer units (households, individuals). Horizontal inequity, on the 
other hand, emerges due to inequality augmentation between equally well-off units. 
These notions are built into the framework of decomposing the redistributive effect into 
two main parts: the vertical effect, representing fulfilment of the vertical equity 
principle, and the horizontal effect, measuring the horizontal inequity. 
 Due to different designs, various tax and benefit instruments have different 
consequences for vertical equity and horizontal inequity of the overall tax and benefit 
systems. The means-tested social benefits are particularly designed to help the poorest 
individuals or households, while the non-means-tested social benefits are dispensed 
irrespectively of the recipient’s personal or household income. One could expect that 
the contribution of means-tested social benefits to vertical equity is larger than the 
contribution of non-means-tested social benefits, while the latter will contribute 
relatively more to horizontal inequity. 
 While social security contributions are typically proportional to their tax base, PIT 
systems are usually designed to create larger relative burden on higher income earners. 
However, social security contributions may also achieve inequality reduction due to 
their usual payers – employed people – receiving on average higher incomes than non-
active people that do not pay social security contributions.  In the present article, we 
analyse redistributive effects of tax and benefit systems in Slovenia and Croatia, two 
neighbouring countries that share a similar socioeconomic background. Both countries 
achieved independency in 1991 after the breakdown of Yugoslavia, and started the 
transition towards market economy from the same tax and benefit system of ex-
common state. 
 In Croatia, the overall income inequality increased between 1998 and 2002 due to 
increased inequality of wages, in spite of better-targeted social transfers that suppressed 
the overall inequality increase (cf. Nestić, 2005). This was confirmed by Bićanić et al. 
(2010), who examined wage inequality and wage differentials for the period from 1970 
to 2008. They concluded that average wage differentials by education and vocational 
training increased through the mid-1990s and then stabilized. The stabilized income 
inequality in the period 2002–2004 is also evident from the World Bank reports (cf. 
World Bank, 2007). On the other hand, the overall inequality of pre-tax income in 
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Slovenia increased as well during the last two decades (Stanovnik and Verbič, 2005; 
Stanovnik and Čok, 2009), while the inequality of after-tax income remained fairly 
stable during 1991–2009 due to changes in the PIT system (Stanovnik and Verbič, 
2012). 
 Developments in both countries during the last two decades were reflected in the 
level of pre- and post-fiscal income inequality. As the results of this article reveal, the 
inequality of pre-fiscal and post-fiscal income was higher in Croatia than in Slovenia. 
However, the aim of this article is neither to investigate the political and economic 
mechanisms that have caused an increase of inequality of pre-fiscal income during the 
last two decades nor to focus on the mechanisms that have created the current tax and 
benefit systems in both countries, but to apply recently developed methodology for the 
measurement of redistributive, vertical and horizontal effects, and to demonstrate their 
usefulness in cross-country comparisons of the role of fiscal systems in reducing 
income inequality. 
 To compare the performance of tax and benefit systems in Slovenia and Croatia, we 
employed the following decompositions of the redistributive effect. First, the Duclos et 
al. (2003) model decomposes the redistributive effect into vertical, classical horizontal 
inequity, and reranking effects. For certain combinations of parameters, the Duclos et 
al. (2003) model then becomes equivalent to the well-known Kakwani’s (1984) 
decomposition of the redistributive effect, which contains only the vertical and 
reranking effects. Finally, all the effects obtained from the Kakwani’s (1984) 
decomposition were further decomposed, following Urban (2012), to reveal 
contributions of individual tax and benefit instruments to the vertical, reranking and 
redistributive effects. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of the 
Duclos et al. (2003) and Urban’s (2012) methodology in comparative analyses of tax 
and benefit systems. The results show significant differences between the two countries 
in almost every respect. Croatia had a higher level of post-fiscal income inequality than 
Slovenia, which was a consequence of higher inequality of pre-fiscal income, as well as 
of a less redistributive tax and benefit system. 
 The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly provide the measurement 
models decomposing the redistributive effect. Section 3 delivers an overview of tax and 
benefit systems in Slovenia and Croatia, followed by a description of income definitions 
and databases used in the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we present and discuss our 
results based on the methodology and data sources presented in the latter two sections. 
The final section concludes with the main findings. 
 
2 Decompositions of the Redistributive Effect 
 
The starting point of our analysis is the redistributive effect, i.e. the change of income 
inequality induced by the fiscal system, where post-fiscal incomes, , are equal to pre-
fiscal incomes, 
N
X , minus taxes, T , plus benefits: 
 
 N X T B= − + . (1) 
 
In measurement terms, we set that ( ) ( )I X I NΔ = − , where  represents the 
redistributive effect, while 
Δ
( )I X  and ( )I N  are indices of pre- and post-fiscal income 
inequality. In what follows, we shall outline several different, but interconnected 
decompositions of the redistributive effect. 
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 In the Duclos et al. (2003) decomposition, inequality indices ( )I ⋅  are derived using 
the Atkinson-Gini social welfare function: 
 
 , (2) 
1
0
( , , ) ( ( ), ) ( , )W X U X p p dpε ν ε ω ν= ∫
 
where ε represents an ethical parameter configuring the Atkinson’s (1970) utility 
function, 1( ( ), ) ( ( )) / (1 )U X p X p εε ε−= − , for 1ε ≠  and with p denoting the quantiles of 
pre-fiscal income distribution, and ( )X p  is the income at p. The term ν  is another 
ethical parameter, characterizing the Donaldson and Weymark’s (1980) and Yitzhaki’s 
(1983) S-Gini rank-dependent weighting scheme, 1( , ) (1 )p p νω ν ν −= − . 
 The equally distributed equivalent income is an inverse function of  and is 
obtained as 
( )W ⋅
[ 1/(1 )( , , ) (1 ) ( , , )X W X ] εξ ε ν ε ε ν −= −  for 1ε ≠ . Finally, the Atkinson-Gini 
inequality index is calculated as follows: 
 
 ( ) 1 ( , , ) / XI X Xξ ε ν μ= − , (3) 
 
where Xμ  is the mean pre-fiscal income. Post-fiscal income inequality, ( )I N , is 
obtained analogously, using the quantiles of post-fiscal income distribution. 
 The Duclos et al. (2003) model decomposes the redistributive effect as follows: 
 
 . (4) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]E P EV C R I X I N I U I N I N I UΔ = − − = − − − − − P
 
The vertical effect, , represents the potential redistributive effect or the 
reduction of inequality that would be achieved by the counterfactual, horizontally 
equitable system. The discrepancy between potential and actual redistributive effect is 
divided into the classical horizontal inequity effect, ( ) ( )
( ) ( )EV I X I N= −
P EC I U I N= − , and reranking 
effect, ( ) ( )PR I N I U= − , which measure two different m
inequity ect (C) measures horizontal inequity emerging from violation of 
the “classical horizontal equity principle”, which says that equals should be treated 
equally. The latter effect (R) evaluates horizontal inequity arising from the infringement 
of the “no-reranking principle”, requiring that fiscal process does not change ranks of 
income units in transition from pre- to post-fiscal income.
anifestations of horizontal 
. The former eff
-fiscal incomes, obtained as 
1 
 In equation (4), ( )E EN N p=  represents expected post
1EN p N q p dq= p  denotes post-fiscal income at the q-th quantile 
me units ing to the p-th quantile of pre-fiscal income 
distribution. ( , )P PU U p
0
( ) ( | )∫
among all those in
, where N q
co  b
( | )
elong
ε=  is the expected post-fiscal utility at the p-th quantile, 
                                                 
1 For example, families A and B have pre-fiscal incomes of 10$, while C and D have 20$. Suppose that 
A, B, C and D end up with post-fiscal incomes of 8$, 16$, 12$ and 24$, respectively. Among pre-fiscal 
equals (A, B) and (C, D) classical horizontal inequity has occurred, while between pre-fiscal unequals (B, 
C) reranking has taken place. 
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obtained as . For  and 
1
0
( , ) ( ( | ), )PU p U N q p dqε = ∫ ε EN PU
, )dν
, )dp
( , ,
, we obtain the respective 
social welfare functions: 
 
 , 
1
0
( , , ) (W N Uε ν = ∫
1
0
( , , )W U Uε ν = ∫
( (E EN p pω), )p ε
, )ε ω , ( (P P p p ν
 
while the corresponding inequality indices are ) 1 ( , , ) /E EI N N Nε ν ξ ε ν= − μ  and 
( , , )P 1 ( , , ) /P NUI U ε ν ξ ε ν μ= − Nμ, where  is the mean post-fiscal income. 
 When 1ν = ( , )p the weights ω ν
( ) 0PI U = 0
 are all equal and reranking disappears, 
. For ( )R I N= − ε > , the vertical and classical horizontal inequity effect, 
( ,1)V ε  and ( ,1)C ε , become indices consistent with the Duclos and Lambert’s (2000) 
model of classical horizontal inequity measurement. 
0 On the other hand, When ε = , utilities are identical to incomes: . 
Therefore, ( ( | ), 0) (U N q p N q=  across all p and ( | )N q p , and it follows that 
( ,0, )EW N
( ,0)U y y=
| )p
( ,0, )PW U ν=  and ( ,0, )I Nν ( ,0, )I UE Pν ν= . The consequence for the Duclos 
et al. (2003) model is that the classical horizontal inequity effect collapses to zero, and 
the decomposition (4) can be rewritten as: 
 
(0, ) ( )) ,0, ) ( ,0, ))E EI N I N(0, ) (0, ) ( ( ,0, )V R I X ,0, ( (I N ν ν νΔ = − =
own that ( , 0, )I X
ν ν ν ν− −− . (5) 
 
( ,0, )EI N νν , ( , 0, )I N ν  and  are the S-Gini coefficient of It can be sh
pre-fiscal income, GX
ν , the S-G i coefficiein nt of post-fiscal income, NG
ν , and the S-Gini 
concentration coefficient of post-fiscal income, ;N XD
ν , respectively.2 
 Consequently, KV
ν  is equal to the S-Gini Kakwani’s (1984) index of the vertical 
effect, ;K X NV G D
ν ν ν= − , and APKRν  is the S-Gini Atkinson (1980), Plotnick (1981) and 
Kakwani (1984) index of reranking, ;
X
APK N N XR G D
ν ν ν= − .3 The Kakwani’s (1984) 
decomposition of the redistributive effect i  horizontal components can 
be rewritten in the S-Gini terms as: 
 
nto v al aertic
( )
nd
 ; ;( )K APK XV R GΔ = − =
ntioned above, the post-fiscal incom
e and adding the benefits,
ν ν ν
N N XD
ν ν− Xν −
 i.e. 
NG D
ν −
 is obtained by subt
N X
. (6) 
As me e racting taxes from 
 
 
pre-fiscal incom T B= − + . Urban (2012) 
                                                 
2 Duclos and Araar (2006) showed that the S-Gini index of inequality is equal to 
, i.e. to deviations of incomes from the mean, weighted by the 
weights 
11
0
( , ) ( ) ( ( )) ( , )X XG X X p p dpν μ μ ω ν−= −∫
( , )pω ν , which depend only on the single ethical parameter ν . When 2ν = , ( , )G X ν  is 
equivalent to the standard Gini coefficient. Consequently, the indices from the family ( ,G X )ν  are called 
“single parameter Gini” indices or (more conveniently) the “S-Gini” indices. 
3 Originally, all these indices were defined for 2ν = . 
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decomposes marginal changes of KV
ν , APKR
ν  and νΔ , to show how each tax and benefit 
instrument contributes to these effects. This model the Lerman and 
Yitzhaki’s (1985) decomposition  overall income inequality into contributions of 
income sources, and is applied to the terms from the Kakwani’s (1984) decomposition 
of the redistributive effect. It raises the following question: if actual values of each tax 
and benefit were changed independently from each other by some small factor e , what 
would be the shares of this tax or benefit in total changes of vertical, reranking and 
redistributive effects? These shares are given on the right hand sides of the following 
three equations, for changes of 
is rooted in 
of
KV
ν , APKR
ν  and νΔ , respectively: 
 
 ; ; ; ;( ) (X N X N N X BG D D D D D
ν ν ν ν ντ β− − + −;T Xν
;
( )N N X
N XD
ν ν
ν
− +
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
; ;T ND
ν
) , (7) 
,⎤⎦
 (8) 
 ; ) , (9) 
here 
X
( X
BD
ν −
+
ντ β+
=
( N
G D
Gν+
− =
X
 
; ;
; ; ; ; ;
)
( ) ( ) (
X N
T X T N N B X N N X
D
D D D G D
ν
ν ν ν ν ν ντ β
=
⎡= − − − −⎣)
G
( )NG
)
 
 
(X N N B ND G G D
ν ν− −Nν ν
 
w τ  and β  are the shares of taxes and be its in pre-fi
 (  coefficients of taxes and benefits 
concentratio
alua
scal income, ;T XD
ν  and nef
;B X
ν
;T N
νD  and ;B ND
νD ) are the S-Gini concentration
with respect to pre-fiscal (post-fiscal) income ranking, and ;X ND
ν  is th Gini 
n coefficients of pre-fiscal income with respect to post-fiscal income 
ranking. The contributions in expressions 
e S-
(7), (8) and (9) are ev ted on the post-
fiscal margin. 
 The sum of contributions to the marginal change of Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani 
reranking effect from (8) is equal to ; ;( ) ( )X N X X N NG D D G
ν ν ν ν− − − , which is different from 
;APK N N XR G D
ν ν= − . Similarly, the sum of contributions to the marginal change of 
redistributive effect from 
ν
to ND G ;X N
ν ν−(9) is equal , which is different from 
X NG G
ν ν ν− . T
overall value
Δ =  differences arise from the fact that expressions hese (8) and (9) reflect 
marginal changes of reranking and redistributive effects (divided by e ), and not their 
s, equal to APKR
ν  and νΔ . Urban (2012) shows that the ratio 
; ;( ) ( )N N X X X NG D G D
ν ν ν ν⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦ ;/( )X N ND Gν ν−  will be greater than the ratio /APKRν νΔ ; in 
other words, the share of the m nal chan  of reranking effect in the marginal change 
ffect in redis e 
 
3 Tax and Benefit Systems and the Data 
 
ar
r
gi
eater
i
g
 than 
e
of redistributive effect will be g the share of reranking e butiv
effect obtained for the “overall ind
or the purpose of the present article, pre-fiscal income was defined as the sum of 
ubject to PIT) and 
ensions. Income from own-use production and transfers of money and goods from 
tri
ces”. 
F
market incomes from different sources (both subject and non-s
p
other persons were not included. Taxes were assembled into three groups: employers’ 
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social security contributions, employees’ social security contributions and the PIT. 
Benefits were divided into means-tested and non-means-tested social benefits. Public 
pensions were part of pre-fiscal income and were not included into benefits. Post-fiscal 
income was obtained according to expression (1). Figure 1 presents pre-fiscal and post-
fiscal sample incomes in Slovenia (in terms of mean pre-fiscal income).4 Table 1 further 
provides a very brief overview of the tax and benefit system in Slovenia and Croatia. 
 
Figure 1: Pre-fiscal and post-fiscal sample incomes in 2007 in Slovenia 
 
0.0
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Note: The “Actual values” represent the actual values of post-fiscal incomes, xiN
t pre
, while the “Expected 
’ show the estimates of expected post-fiscal incomes, plotted agains -fiscal incomes, values EiN , 
x
iX . 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 According to the PIT system in Croatia, capital incomes (capital gains, dividends, 
subject to taxation. Income from employment, domestic pensions 
nd 
                                                
and interest) were not 
a income from self-employment were subject to progressive tax schedule with four 
tax brackets, with marginal tax rates of 15%, 25%, 35% and 45% in 2007.5 Tax 
schedule was then applied to the tax base, obtained as the difference between the overall 
income and the amount of personal allowance and other tax allowances. For some 
income sources (e.g. income from contractual work and rental income), different flat 
rates were applied, ranging from 15% to 45%. The surtax is obtained as a percentage of 
PIT, with the rates ranging from 0% to 18%, set by the local municipalities. Unit of 
taxation was an individual taxpayer. 
 Employers’ and employees’ social security contributions were equal to 17.2% and 
 
4 Graphic representation of sample incomes in Croatia is omitted due to similarity to the Slovenian 
sample; the distribution of sample incomes in Croatia is somewhat less dispersed, though. 
5 Submission of a tax file can be obligatory (in certain pre-defined conditions and for certain groups of 
taxpayers) or voluntary (when a taxpayer wants to use some allowances and deductions). Since 2010, 
there are three tax brackets with marginal tax rates of 12%, 25% and 40%. 
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20% of gross wage, respectively. Combined social security contribution rate for the 
self-employed was equal to 35%.6 Pension insurance system contained two mandatory 
ns), business income, income from 
Slovenia Croatia 
pillars: “solidarity” pension insurance and “capitalized accounts”. Majority of the 
insured were participating in both pillars, paying 15% of the gross wage to the former 
and 5% to the latter. In our analysis below, we treated only the social security 
contributions to the “solidarity” pillar as taxes, while the outlays to “capitalized 
accounts” were equivalent to personal savings. 
 Slovenia had a similar PIT system, though with several differences. PIT in Slovenia 
was set at the individual level (as in Croatia), and levied on six categories of income: 
income from employment (including pensio
agriculture and forestry, income from rents and royalties, income from capital, and other 
income accruing to persons liable to tax. Current personal income tax code was adopted 
in 2007, when a 20% flat tax rate for income from capital income was introduced. 
Other, non-capital income was subject to progressive tax schedule with three tax 
brackets and marginal tax rates of 16%, 27% and 41%. Rate of social security 
contributions (without any ceiling) was set at 22.1% for employees and 16.1% for 
employers. The self-employed paid an overall rate of 38.2% by themselves. 
 
Table 1: Tax and benefit system in Slovenia and Croatia 
 
 
Taxes   
PIT – personal income tax  – personal income tax and surtax 
Employers' social 
 contributions 
h insurance 
– for pension insur  
urance 
surance 
lth insurance 
– for unemployment insurance security
– for healt
ance
– for unemployment ins
– for maternity leave in
– for hea
Employees' social 
security contributions 
– for health insurance 
– for pension insurance 
– for unemployment insurance 
surance – for maternity leave in
– for pension insurance 
Benefits    
Means-tested 
 scholarships 
ementa 
– basic support allowance 
– child allowance 
– child benefit 
– unemployment assistance 
–
– pension suppl
Non-means-tested 
 
nt  
 compensation  
t 
– maternity and layette supplement 
n and 
– birth grant  
– parental allowanceb 
– childcare supplement 
 suppleme– large-family
– unemployment wage
– disability supplement 
– unemployment benefit 
– sick-leave benefi
– support for rehabilitatio
employment of people with 
disabilities 
 
Notes: a Mean-tested bene
 b Non-mean-tested  for
compensation du
es. 
                                                
fit for low-income pensioners. 
is not eligiblebenefit for a parent, who 
ring the parental leave. 
 the insurance-based wage 
 
Source: Own classification based on administrative sourc
 
6 The base for social security contributions of the self-employed was set to 35% – 110% of the national 
average gross wage for different groups of the self-employed (those working in agriculture and forestry, 
craftsmen, freelancers etc.). 
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 he data for two countries arrived from different sources. For Croatia, we T used the 
2007, collected by the Croatian Bureau of 
inistrative database prepared 
Household Budget Survey data for the year 
Statistics. For Slovenia, the data were taken from the adm
also for the year 2007 by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. Samples 
contain 3,151 households for Slovenia and 2,983 households for Croatia. We chose year 
2007, as it is the most recent year for which comparable data for both countries were 
available. Since then, tax and benefit system in neither country has changed 
substantially. 
 Unit of analysis was a household. Incomes were deflated by an equivalence factor, 
obtained by using the “modified OECD scale”, 1 0.5( 1) 0.3k k ka cβ = + − + , where ka  
and c  are thek
 
4 Results of the Analysis 
 
To start with, Table 2 presents the results of decompositions. The upper s
 number of adults and children in household 
ection of the 
ity indices, as well as of the redistributive 
 of values of ethical parameters. The lower section of the 
k, respectively. 
table gives the estimates of different inequal
effect for four combinations
table contains estimates of vertical, classical horizontal inequity and reranking effects, 
obtained by application of the Duclos et al. (2003) and Kakwani (1984) models. 
 
Table 2: Income inequality, the redistributive effect and its decomposition in 2007 
 
 2ν = , 0ε =  2ν = , 0.5ε =  
 Slovenia Croatia Slovenia Croatia 
 Value % pfi Value % pfi Value % pfi Value % pfi 
ˆ( )xiI X  0.3640 100.0 0.3932 100.0 0.4286 100.0 0.4673 100.0 
ˆ( )niI N  0.28 .0 0.3139 79.8 0.32 .4 0.3598 77.0 76 79 76 76
ˆ( )xiI N  0.2757 75.7 0.3065 78.0 0.3176 74.1 0.3535 75.7 
ˆ( )EiI N  0.2757 75.7 0.3065 78.0 0.3095 72.2 0.3476 74.4 
ˆ ( , )ε νΔ  0.0765 21.0 0.0792 20.2 0.1010 23.6 0.1074 23.0 
 %Value % RE Value % RE Value  RE Value % RE 
ˆ( , )V ε ν  0.0884 115.5 0.0867 109.4 0.1191 117.9 0.1197 111.4 
ˆ ( , )C ε ν  0.0000 0.0 0.0000 0.0 0.0081 8.0 0.0059 5.5 
ˆ( , )R ε ν  0.0119 15.5 0.0074 9.4 0.0100 9.9 0.0063 5.9 
 
 , ,  1ν =  3ν = 0.5 0.5ε = ε =
 nia roatia nia roatia Slove  C Slove  C
 Value % pfi Value % pfi Value % pfi Value % pfi 
ˆ( )xiI X  0.5481 1 0.0 0.5929 100.0 0.1204 1 0.0 0.1365 100.0 0 0
ˆ( )niI N  0.4313 78.7 0.4724 79.7 0.0746 61.9 0.0827 60.6 
ˆ( )xiI N  0.4179 76.2 0.4632 78.1 0.0746 61.9 0.0827 60.6 
ˆ( )EiI N  0.4087 74.6 0.4567 77.0 0.0672 55.8 0.0774 56.7 
ˆ ( , )ε νΔ  0.1169 21.3 0.1205 20.3 0.0458 38.1 0.0539 39.4 
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 %Value % RE Value % RE Value  RE Value % RE 
ˆ( , )V ε ν  0.1394 119.3 0.1362 113.1 0.0532 116.1 0.0591 109.8 
ˆ ( , )C ε ν  0.0091 7.8 0.0066 5.5 0.0074 16.1 0.0053 9.8 
ˆ ( , )R ε ν  0.0134 11.5 0.0091 7.6 0.0000 0.0 0.0000 0.0 
 
Notes: % ge o isca ity, ˆ( )xiI X pfi = percenta f pre-f l inequal ; 
% RE = percentage of redistributive effect, ˆ ( )Δ ⋅ . 
 
: Own calculations. Source
ection 2, when 
 
0=ε As explained in S , the Atkinson-Gini indices of inequality 
ecob me S-Gini indices, while the Duclos et al. (2003) model turns into S-Gini 
Kakwani’s (1984) model.7 Furthermore, if 0=ε  and 2=ν  we obtain standard Gini 
indices and Kakwani’s (1984) model as originally conceived. This is presented by the 
first scenario in Table 2. The last scenario tak tion of 1es the combina ν =  and 0.5ε = , 
consistent with the Duclos and Lambert’s (2000) model. Thus, the first and the last 
scenarios are the “extreme” ones – the former lacking the classical h ontal i y 
term, and in the latter the reranking term being absent. On the other hand, scenarios 2 
and 3 contain both the reranking and classical horizontal inequity effects. 
 Comparing the results from Table 2 for Slovenia and Croatia across the different 
scenarios, several important conclusions can be drawn. First, Croatia ha
oriz nequit
d higher pre-
fiscal income inequality than Slovenia, as reflected in ˆ( )xiI X . The indicator ˆ ( , )ε νΔ , 
expressed as percentage of ˆ( )xiI X , suggests that the rela istributive effect  
countries was of similar magnitude, but slightly higher in Slovenia. Consequently, post-
fiscal income inequality wa higher in Croatia than in Slovenia by about 10%, as 
indicated by ˆ( )ni
tive red  in two
s also 
I N . Second, horizontal inequity was significantly larger in Slovenia, as 
can be seen by inspecting the combined value of ˆ ( , )C ε ν  and ˆ( , )R ε ν , which ranges 
from 15.5% to 19.3% of the redistributive effect in Slovenia, and from 9.8% to 13.1% 
of the redistributive effect in Croatia. 
 Figure 2 illustrates the same results for a larger range of values ε. The columns of 
the histograms are divided into two parts: the bottom part represents the share of the 
redistributive effect in pre-fiscal income inequality, i.e. the ratio of ˆ ( , )ε νΔ  to ˆ( )xiI X , 
while the top part shows the share of overall horizontal inequity in pre-fiscal income 
inequality, i.e. the ratio of ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )C Rε ν ε ν+  to ˆ( )xiI X . The full heig  
represents the vertical effect of the tax and benefit system, since according to expression 
ht of each column
(4), ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( ,V C ˆ) ( , )Rε ν ε ν ε= Δ +
 
 
ν ε ν+ . 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For detailed technical exposition of the Duclos et al. (2003) and Kakwani (1984) models, and step-by-
step implementation procedures see Urban (2011). 
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Figure 2: Shares of redistributive and horizontal inequity effects in the pre-fiscal 
income inequality in 2007 
(a) 
 
2ν =  
Slovenia     Croatia 
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(b) 3=  ν
Slovenia     Croatia 
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Notes: RE/IX = ˆ ( , ˆ) / ( )xiI X ; HI/IX = ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( , ) ( , )] / ( )
x
iC R I Xε ν ε ν+ . ε νΔ
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 Slovenia achieved a larger relative redistributive effect than Croatia, but the 
difference decreased with ε, so that for  the share of ˆ ( , )ε νΔ  in ˆ( )xiI X0.7ε >  was 
higher for Croatia. The differences between the two countries were much more 
noticeable in the case of horizontal inequity; it can be easily observed that Slovenia had 
significantly larger horizontal inequity than Croatia. Taking the redistributive effect and 
horizontal inequity together, we also see that the vertical effect was larger in Slovenia. 
 Next, Figure 3 looks more closely into the relationships between different effects, 
obtained by the Duclos et al. (2003) decomposition. Again, we use the property that the 
vertical effect is a sum of the redistributive effect, classical horizontal inequity and 
reranking effects, trying to reveal the share of each in the vertical effect. 
 The share of overall horizontal inequity in the vertical effect, measured as 
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( , ) ( , )] / ( , )C R Vε ν ε ν ε+ ν , ranged from 14% (for 2ν =  and 0.9ε = ) to 17% (for 
3ν =  and 0.7ε = ) in Slovenia, and between 8% (for 2ν =  and 0.9ε = ) and 11% (for 
3ν =  and 0.6ε = inated the classical horizontal 
equity effect a  
) in Croatia. The reranking effect 
 values of ε, but as ε ffect took over. It is 
 shares of classical horizon ifferent 
 for 
dom
 increased, the latter e
tal in
in t lower
t the
alues of ε were the same
interesting to notice tha equity effect across d
 and 3ν =2ν = . On the other hand, larger νv  brought 
 effect. Theref are of overall 
ed with 
larger shares of reranking in the vertical
horizontal inequity in the vert
ore, the sh
ical effect increas ν . 
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Figure 3: Shares of redistributive, classical horizontal inequity and reranking effects in 
the vertical effect in 2007 
 
(a) 2ν =  
Slovenia     Croatia 
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(b) 3ν =  
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Source: Own calculati
 
 Thus, one of the main conclusions from the above comparison of two countries is 
that the Slovenian tax and benefit system created much larger horizontal inequity than 
the Croatian tax and benefit system, while the redistributive effect was only slightly 
higher in Slovenia. How could this be explained, i.e. what tax and benefit instruments 
were responsible for these results? The answers are provided by applying the Urban’s 
(2012) decomposition of vertical, reranking and redistributive effects, with the results 
presented in Table 3 and Figure 4. 
Table 3: Decomposition of vertical, reranking 
benefit in
ons. 
 
and redistributive effects by tax and 
struments in 2007, 2=ν  
 
(a) Slovenia 
 
sscer sscee pit mt nmt taxes benefits overall 
Section 1: Contributions 
mcVK 0.0170 0.0231 0.0348 0.0138 -0.0003 0.0749 0.0135 0.0884 
mcRAPK 0.0079 0.0108 0.0055 0.0003 0.0012 0.0242 0.0015 0.0257 
mcRE 0.0091 0.0122 0.0294 0.0135 -0.0015 0.0507 0.0120 0.0627 
Section 2: Contributions as percentage of overall mcRE 
mcVK 27.1 36.8 55.6 22.0 -0.5 119.5 21.5 140.9 
mcRAPK 12.6 17.3 8.8 0.4 1.9 38.6 2.3 40.9 
mcRE 14.5 19.5 46.8 21.6 -2.4 80.8 19.2 100.0 
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Section 3: Normalized contributions 
mcVK 0.44 0.43 1.00 1.83 -0.11 0.59 1.31 0.52 
mcRAPK 1.29 1.29 1.00 0.23 2.69 1.21 0.90 0.96 
mcRE 0.28 0.27 1.00 2.13 -0.64 0.47 1.38 0.44 
% pfinc 10.2 14.0 9.1 2.0 0.7 33.3 2.7 36.0 
 
(b) Croatia 
 
sscer sscee pit  nmt taxes benefits overall mt
Section 1: Contributions 
mcVK 0.0218 0.0212 0.0269 0.0098 0.0069 0.0700 0.0167 0.0867 
mcRAPK 0.0057 0.0056 0.0015 0.0012 0.0029 0.0128 0.0040 0.0168 
mcRE 0.0162 0.0157 0.0254 0.0087 0.0040 0.0572 0.0127 0.0699 
Section 2: Contributions as percentage of overall mcRE 
mcVK 31.2 30.4 38.5 14.0 9.9 100.1 23.9 124.0 
mcRAPK 8.1 8.0 2.2 1.7 4.1 18.2 5.8 24.0 
mcRE 23.1 22.4 36.3 1 .4 5.8 81.8 18.2 100.0 
Section 3: Normalized contributions 
2
mcVK 0.46 0.47 1.00 1.73 1.17 0.59 1.45 0.66 
mcRAPK 2.10 2.16 1.00 3.61 8.55 1.88 6.12 2.25 
mcRE 0.36 0.37 1.00 1.62 0.73 0.51 1.16 0.57 
% pfinc 10.3 9.9 5.9 1.2 1.3 26.0 2.5 28.5 
 
Notes: sscer – employers’ social security contributions, sscee – employee’s social security contributions, 
pit – personal income tax, nmt – non-means-tested benefits, and mt – means-tested benefits; mcVK, 
mcRAPK, and mcRE – decompositions of marginal changes of the Kakwani vertical, Atkinson-Plotnick-
Kakwani and redistributive effects, according to expressions (7), (8) and (9), respectively; % pfinc = 
percentage of pre-fiscal income. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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 The exceptions are social security contribu mployment insurance in both countries and 
social security contributions for maternity leave in Slovenia. However, their size is relatively 
small in comparison to pension and health expenditures. 
8 tions for une
insurance 
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 In Section 2 of Table 3 we can observe that love ro  m l 
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of tax or benefit. From this perspective, social security contributions had a much weaker 
influence on income redistribution (between one third and one half of the PIT’s). 
 Social security contributions had the strongest role in creation of reranking. Taken 
together, they decreased the potential redistributive effect by 29.9 (16.1) percentage 
oints in Slovenia (Croatiap
these taxes were paid 
in
cr ted much more reranking (8.8% of mcRE) than Croatian PIT (2.2% of mcRE). 
 On the other hand, Croatian benefits induced a lot more reranking (5.8% of mcRE, 
combined) than benefits in Slovenia (2.3% of mcRE). Another large difference between 
two countries was the role of non-means-tested benefits. In Croatia they made a 
relatively large contribution to the redistributive effect (5.8% of mcRE), while in 
Slovenia they increased inequality (–2.4% of mcRE). 
 
Figure 4: Contributions of taxes and benefits 
effects in 2007, for 2ν =  
 
0.02
0.03
0.04
Slovenia Croatia
0.00
0.01
sscer sscee pit mt nmt sscer sscee pit mt nmt sscer sscee pit mt nmt
Vertical effect Reranking effect Redistributive effect  
 
Notes: sscee – employee’s social security contributions, sscer – employers’ social security contributions, 
pit – personal income tax, nmt – non-means-tested benefits, and mt – means-tested benefits. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Even though Croatia and Slovenia share a similar background, they have developed in 
different ways during the last two decades. A major consequence of this divergent 
development is higher pre-fiscal income inequality in Croatia. Both countries also differ 
in the characteristics of their tax and benefit systems. In this article, we focused on the 
analysis of the redistributive effects of tax and benefit systems consisting of employers’ 
and employee’s social security contributions, personal income tax, and a wide range of 
means-tested and non-means-tested social benefits. 
 
ition 
efit system created a much larger 
ertical effect than the Croatian tax and benefit system. However, the former system 
al 
effect, wi e redistributive effect was only slightly higher in 
lovenia. In both countries, the ov rall size of taxes was much higher than the size of 
benefits. Namely, in Croatia (Slovenia) taxes made 26% (33.3%) of pre-fiscal income, 
against the share of benefits equal to 2.5% (2.7%) of pre-fiscal income. The reason of 
this disproportion is clear: social security contributions were used to finance the outlays 
of the pension and health systems, but the respective benefits obtained by households 
from these systems were not covered by the analysis. 
 Moreover, the contributions of taxes and benefits were evaluated on the post-fiscal 
income margin, answering to the question: if actual values of each tax and benefit are 
changed independently from each other by some small factor , what are the shares of 
this tax or benefit in total marginal changes of vertical, reranking and redistributive 
effects? Despite their small share in comparison to taxes, the benefits created about one 
fifth of the overall redistributive effect in Slovenia and Croatia. However, there was a 
large difference between the impact produced by means-tested and non-means-tested
ocial benefits in the two countries. In Slovenia, the vertical effect of non-means-tested 
sted social 
ertical effect, albeit relatively smaller than the vertical effect of 
efits. 
IT was the largest contributor to the vertical effect in both 
of pre-fiscal income in Slovenia, it accounted for 55.6% of 
 For the purpose of our analysis, we employed a series of decompositions of the 
redistributive effect that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been done before in this 
manner. First, we decomposed the redistributive effect into vertical, classical horizontal 
inequity, and reranking effects. Additionally, we performed the well-known Kakwani’s 
decomposition of the redistributive effect, which contains only the vertical and 
reranking effects. Finally, all the effects obtained from the Kakwani’s decompos
were uniquely decomposed to reveal contributions of individual tax and benefit 
instruments to the vertical, reranking and redistributive effects. In particular, this is the 
first application of the Duclos et al. (2003) and Urban’s (2012) methodology in 
comparative analyses of tax and benefit systems. 
 The results reveal that the Slovenian tax and ben
v
also induced much more horizontal inequity, which cancelled the advantage in vertic
th the final result that th
eS
e
 
s
social benefits was close to zero, indicating that these benefits were on average almost 
proportional to pre-fiscal income. On the other hand, in Croatia non-means-te
benefits did induce a v
eans-tested social benm
 On the revenue side, P
ountries. Absorbing 9.1% c
the vertical effect; in Croatia the PIT took up 5.9% of pre-fiscal income and was 
responsible for 38.5% of the vertical effect.  Social security contributions contributed 
significantly to the vertical effect; in Slovenia (Croatia) they accounted for 63.9% 
(61.6%) of the vertical effect. Social security contributions also introduced quite a lot of 
reranking in both countries. This result was not unexpected, because we know that these 
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taxes were paid prevalently by the employees and not by pensioners and other inactive 
groups that made a large part of population in these countries. The contribution of PIT 
e Slovenian tax and benefit system. 
ića
 (2006) Poverty and Equity: Measurement, Policy and 
E
to reranking in Croatia was surprisingly low, amounting to only 2.2% of the 
redistributive effect, compared to 8.8% of the redistributive effect in Slovenia. 
Reranking caused by Slovenian non-means-tested social benefits further aggravated 
their negative contribution to redistributive effect. However, the contribution of benefits 
in Croatia to reranking was six times higher than in Slovenia, evidencing another 
divergence between the two systems. 
 Taking into account these results, we can conclude that Slovenia revealed lower 
pre-fiscal income and post-fiscal equality than Croatia. Even though Croatian tax and 
benefit system contributed substantially to the equalisation of post-fiscal income, it was 
still slightly less redistributive compared to th
Croatian PIT induced much less horizontal inequity than the Slovenian PIT, while the 
opposite was true for benefits. 
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